Peace deal that saved Bosnia hinders its development

By Drazen Simic Nov 20, 2010, 11:54 GMT

   Sarajevo - The Dayton peace agreement ended the war in Bosnia 15 years ago by effectively dividing the former Yugoslav republic along ethnic lines, but today that accord is an obstacle to the country's development and European integration.

   The deal, brokered by the United States and accepted by Serbian, Croat and Bosnian leaders November 21, 1995, created a state with weak central authority and powerful, nearly sovereign ethnic entities.

   The formula worked, stopping the fighting after 40 months and an endless series of failed ceasefires. It paved the way for the arrival of a NATO-led peacekeeping mission, an international administration and billions of dollars of reconstruction aid.

   'The Dayton peace agreement initially exceeded expectations, then fell short of them,' Srecko Latal, an analyst at the International Crisis Group, told the German Press Agency dpa.

   'When it was signed, people just wanted the war to stop,' Latal said. 'Later it disappointed, because the Bosnian administration created in Dayton was unable to overcome itself and transform Bosnia into an efficient state.'

   The compromise, which set the end of bloodshed as its primary goal, divided Bosnia in two: one part for the Serbs in the Serb Republic, the other for Muslims and Croats in the Federation Bosnia- Herzegovina.

   To further mollify ethnic communities, the federation was further split into 10 cantons, each with a high level of legislative, administrative and judicial autonomy.

   As a result, Bosnia today has 14 governments, 14 prime ministers, five presidents and more than 150 ministers, many of whom have overlapping authorities and jurisdiction.

   Central institutions - the tripartite Presidency as the collective head of state, the two-chamber parliament and the government - are held hostage to ethnic leaders who can block any legislation.

   The complex, inefficient system, which employs 70,000 public servants, this year cost Bosnia a total of 1.3 billion euros (1.8 billion dollars), burning almost half of the money in the various Bosnian budgets.

   The agreement, of course, is not a complete failure. After all, it did end a conflict in which 100,000 people died.

   When the war ended, there were three hostile armies in Bosnia, three security and intelligence services, three police forces, two central banks, two currencies and a devastated economy and infrastructure.

   That's all changed. Now there is an integrated army and a single currency - the convertible mark, pegged to the euro. There is one internal revenue service and a single intelligence and security agency.

   The country's infrastructure - the power grid, the gas and water supplies - has been largely restored, thanks to some 5.3 billion dollars provided by foreign donors in the first five years of peace.

   It was about that time, in 2000, that Bosnia outgrew the Dayton peace agreement. The compromises aimed at preventing any side from gaining the upper hand led to the country's political paralysis.

   With all the power concentrated in ethnic communities, fiery nationalist rhetoric remains a much safer bet for politicians than declaring a willingness to negotiate and compromise.

   Serb leader Milorad Dodik has built his dominance in the Serb entity on threats of secession and rejection of any changes to the constitutional framework.

   A year ago, he flat-out rejected reforms the United States and European Union proposed to transfer some authority from the entities to the central government.

   Dodik continues to insist that for Serbs, autonomy is more important than Bosnia's membership in NATO and EU. His compatriots continue to back him: He won re-election as president in October.

   Bosnian Muslim, or Bosniak, politicians are quick to blame the Dayton peace agreement for strengthening the Serbs' hand. They put their hopes in the possibility that the international community can push the Serbs to accept necessary constitutional changes.

Croats, for their part, are seeking their own administrative unit - or entity - as protection against Bosniak and Serb domination.

   'Bosnia's key problem is a vision of its future shared by political leaders,' an EU enlargement official, Dimitris Kourkoulas, said recently in Sarajevo.

   Until Bosnia finds a way to move forward, its Muslims, Serbs and Croats will remain stuck halfway between Dayton and Brussels, between the fatigued EU and their own bickering leaders.