Middle East News
ANALYSIS: Iraq crackdown strengthens radical cleric and Iran
Apr 1, 2008, 15:50 GMT
Cairo - When Iraq's Prime Minister launched an unprecedented offensive to assert his government's control over southern oil-rich Basra last week, he certainly was not planning what came about.
Nuri al-Maliki, his ministers and generals vowed, and still do, to go after militias and 'outlaws' to the end. The main target of the offensive, though not officially declared, has been Mahdi Army of firebrand Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
But within days of the offensive, Sadrist militiamen were still keeping their turf and weapons, and giving government troops a hard time. Hundreds of people were killed and injured in the offensive.
Many say the fighting in Basra, which spread to Iraq's southern cities and the Sadrists' strongholds in Baghdad, exposed the fact that Iraqi security forces were not prepared for this large-scale operation.
'I think the operation in Basra was not planned. It was hastily carried out,' Osama al-Nujaifi, a member of Iraq's parliament, told Deutsche Presse-Agentur, dpa.
The timing of the offensive and the way it was directed were wrong, al-Nujaifi said.
Al-Maliki himself flew to Basra to conduct the offensive from there.
John McCain, the US Republican presidential candidate, was surprised by the blitz offensive.
'Al-Maliki decided to take on this operation himself without consulting the Americans,' McCain said Monday.
'I am surprised that he would take it on himself to go down and take charge of a military offensive,' McCain said.
Iraqi Defence Minister Abdel-Qader al-Obeidi conceded that troops were meeting far more resistance than expected.
Several multinational forces officials were aware that a major crackdown against militias in Basra was in the offing, but were led to believe by Iraqi army commanders it would be launched in June, according to media reports.
When it was launched abruptly last Tuesday, some British officials said they had been given less than 24 hours notice, British newspaper The Times reported.
Five days into the battle, al-Maliki found himself turning to his political foe, al-Sadr, for a way out.
Behind the scenes, al-Maliki's emissaries were meeting with al- Sadr in Iran under the auspices of Brigadier-General Qasim Suleymani from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, media reports revealed.
Al-Sadr, currently in the Iranian holy city of Qom, suddenly called his militiamen off the streets on Sunday a day after he defied al-Maliki and called his government a 'dictatorship.'
Al-Sadr emerged as peace-maker and Iran consolidated its position as the main power broker in Iraq, analysts think.
'It has now become clear how far Iranian interference in Iraq's internal affairs has gone. It is clear how Iran is supporting rival factions involved in the fighting in Basra,' al-Nujaifu said.
'I think this interference will increase in the future,' he adds.
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Older Talkback
page: 1
...quarterbacks above, neglect to mention this only turns out one way:
Bad
That being the case, go in and do it fast. If you're pimping yourself as the government, it's better to be seen as failing, if that is even the case here, than not being seen at all.
Not consulting with the Americans is a sign they feel confident and builds credibility.
There are lots of ways to measure success.
What ever happened to the good old days of Saddam.
Oh ! Piss on Iran's radical cleric !
What a numbnuts analysis that was!!?!?!??? What do you take the readers for? Fellow arab wingnuts??? We're just not that stupid out here.
Muqtada called it quits because he knew the Americans would be no more than 5 steps behind Maliki in this offensive. Imm glad it was a surprise, because at least this gives the rest of the free world hope that Maliki is beginning to become the commander-in-chief he must in order to shit- can this 'wannabe somebody' Sadr!! Sadr is finished now and he knows it.
Not even Ahm in my dinnah jacket is going to bring any further influence to Basra nor the north of Iraq anymore. Get your fat ass out of the way Sadr---You're far too radical to have a positive influence inside Baghdad.
Either get lost or face a few F-16's and MOAB's til u learn what an honest military will do to you.
all i ever want in my life ,is to have Sex with Farrah Fawcett !
Contrary to SP-4's opinion, there is much positive here: talk to someone
who has been on the offensive in urban warfare (whether a Marine in Hue during Tet of 68 or one of the men involved in Somalia during the Black-
Hawk down incident or one of the current vets) there is every advantage
to the defender in this type of warfare. Yet, the Iraqi national forces
managed to take 1/3 or so of Basra. Despite the bluster of Sadr's militia,
they know that they were being beaten and their morale will have taken a blow - they'll be less willing to try this again. Correspondingly, the
Iraqi national forces have gained morale, confidence and cohesion that
they otherwise might not have had.
Secondly, this is a message to others who would rather fight than cooperate
that there is now a willingness and ability in the Iraqi national forces
to work for stability and security even to the point of combat.
'SP4: Monday Morning
...quarterbacks above, neglect to mention this only turns out one way:
Bad'
Dead Mahdi militia are always a good thing. kicking the legs out from under one off one of Iran's proxy's is priceless.
www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/32055.html
Iranian general played key role in Iraq cease-fire
BAGHDAD — Iraqi lawmakers traveled to the Iranian holy city of Qom over the weekend to win the support of the commander of Iran's Qods brigades in persuading Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr to order his followers to stop military operations, members of the Iraqi parliament said.
Sadr ordered the halt on Sunday, and his Mahdi Army militia heeded the order in Baghdad, where the Iraqi government announced it would lift a 24-hour curfew starting early Monday in most parts of the capital.
thinkprogress.org/2008/04/01/mccain-sadr-facts-wrong/
As Mother Jones’ Jonathan Stein notes today, McCain’s description of what happened is “completely misleading” and wrong. In fact, Sadr’s call for a ceasefire only came after members of Maliki’s political party traveled to Iran to broker a deal with him:
The backdrop to Sadr’s dramatic statement was a secret trip Friday by Iraqi lawmakers to Qom, Iran’s holy city and headquarters for the Iranian clergy who run the country. There the Iraqi lawmakers held talks with Brig. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Qods (Jerusalem) brigades of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and signed an agreement with Sadr, which formed the basis of his statement Sunday, members of parliament said.
Ali al Adeeb, a member of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s Dawa party, and Hadi al Ameri, the head of the Badr Organization, the military wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, had two aims, lawmakers said: to ask Sadr to stand down his militia and to ask Iranian officials to stop supplying weapons to Shiite militants in Iraq.
According to the AP, “the peace deal between al-Sadr and Iraqi government forces” not only “left the cleric’s Mahdi Army intact,” but it also left Maliki “politically battered and humbled within his own Shi’ite power base.”
thinkprogress.org/2008/04/01/mccain-sadr-facts-wrong/
As Mother Jones’ Jonathan Stein notes today, McCain’s description of what happened is “completely misleading” and wrong. In fact, Sadr’s call for a ceasefire only came after members of Maliki’s political party traveled to Iran to broker a deal with him.
online.wsj.com/public/article/SB120695720918576769-0pc9ooRI2xihRh9C_ukvjPe2 O4M_20080501.html?mod=tff_main_tff_top
The Iraqi government's inability to oust Moqtada al-Sadr's militia from Basra has boosted the fortunes of the Shiite cleric while damaging the standing of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
Mr. Sadr appears to be the one clear winner from the inconclusive fighting in the country's second-biggest city, which began to taper off Monday after the cleric urged his followers to observe a truce.
The failure of the Iraqi strikes against Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army has implications for both U.S. policy in Iraq and the presidential campaign.
Worsening conditions in Iraq pose a particular challenge for likely Republican nominee Sen. John McCain, who has staked his candidacy on his ability to persuade antiwar voters that victory in Iraq remains possible. Sen. McCain departed from his usual talking points about Iraq Monday to say that he was surprised by Mr. Maliki's decision to order the Basra strike. 'Maliki decided to take on this operation without consulting the Americans,' he told reporters traveling with him in Mississippi. 'I'm surprised he'd take it on himself to go down and take charge of a military offensive.'
U.S. and British commanders said that Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army fought the Iraqi forces to a draw and were able to retain their control over large portions of Basra and other Shiite areas of the country.
Want to see 'getting it wrong'?
''“I don’t want to suggest I’ve absorbed all of the facts,” about the situation in Basra, Mr. Obama said. But, he continued, what he had heard “appears consistent with my general analysis. The presence of our troops and their excellence has resulted in some reduction in violence. It has not resolved the underlying tensions that exist in Iraq.”''
www.nytimes.com/2008/03/30/us/politics/30campaign.html?_r=1
As if that’s not everyone’s analysis.
Neither George Bush or John McCain or David Petraeus has ever said anything to contradict Obama’s valueless declaration. They have never suggested that the surge had “resolved the underlying tensions.”
This is the all-or-nothing rhetorical game the Democrats play with Iraq. They pretend the McCain side of the debate makes outlandishly sunny claims and then they “disprove” them. They overstate non-scandalous aspects of both McCain’s Iraq plan (the hundred-year war) and our present Iraq strategy: Last Tuesday in Pennsylvania, Hillary Clinton said, “President Bush seems to want to keep as many people as possible in Iraq. It’s a clear admission that the surge has failed to accomplish its goals.” Wrong and wrong. And shameful, to boot.
So, Obama admits he has not “absorbed all of the facts,” but that’s because he doesn’t need to. He just needs to spin stories of violence into the narrative of Bush’s failed miracle. However, if he bothered to “absorb” just a little more of the admittedly confusing Basra situation, he’d have to confront the conflict’s one crystalline detail: the British pulled out too soon. And there’s no way for him to spin that.
www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/greenwald/3127
So Obama hasn't absorbed all the facts... or any for that matter, he quite simply tells idiots like you what they want to hear and you eat it up like the ignorant, salivating jackals that you are.
'As Mother Jones’ Jonathan Stein notes today, McCain’'
So you get your news from:
Alternet
Mother Jones
thinkprogress
mcclatchydc
As well as Kos, commondreams, and you have even posted garbage from uruknet.info...
No wonder you are so screwed up, you consume nothing but spin and propaganda and outright lies. That may be fine for an idiot like you but it is an insult to other peoples intelligence to post this garbage as if it were fact.
'Iranian general played key role in Iraq cease-fire'
cknowledging Iran's War [Steve Schippert]
In the great game that is the largely one-sided Iranian conflict with American forces in Iraq (and the greater international psychological image of the American presence there), many factors are in play right now. And I think Richard Fernandez at The Belmont Club is on to something here. [...]
ne of the rumored frictions between Petraeus and former CENTCOM CINC 'Fox' Fallon centered around how strongly to respond to threats from Iranian sponsored groups. And Sadr's men would fall under that category. Maj Gen Paul Vallely was quoted as saying CENTCOM may not have been done all that it could to prevent Iran from endangering American troops.
“The fact is that [Central Command] had the external responsibility to protect our troops in Iraq from the outside and under Fallon they failed to do it,” said retired Maj. Gen. Paul Vallely, a military analyst. “We have done nothing to protect our soldiers from external threats in Iraq.”
I said yesterday that '[i]t's not entirely up to us whether or not we are in conflict with Iran.' The Iranians have (and have had) plenty to say about that.
But for goodness sakes, don't take General David Petraeus's word for it.
Oh, no. Instead, cry out, 'O Admiral Fallon, where art thou?' That should help.
And with Admiral Fallon out at CENTCOM, Iran has lost some level of protection, if the rumored friction between him and General Petraeus is believed by the Iranians (what you and I think does not matter here). That may be driving Iran's latest move in the great game: Stoking the embers of conflict.
This strategy affords Iran two things: Engineered instability within Iraq that plays greatly to their advantage and, equally significant, the ability to prod the U.S. military into more aggressive public statements about Iranian involvement in Iraq. The Iranians are smart, and they know that a significant number of voices in America are ready, willing and able to continue painting the Bush Administration as overly aggressive and seeking a hot war with Iran.
Of course, the fact that Iran is actually prosecuting such a war through its proxies is less important than criticizing the president. And the Iranians know this. Stoking the conflict and drawing anti-Iranian words and military actions from Petraeus and the administration on the heels of Admiral Fallon's exit is a move to shape perception and position. If one looks at how 'Fox' Fallon's exit was portrayed in the U.S .media - as the loss of presumably the one sane mind between the Bush Administration and war with Iran - the tone of the media response to U.S. military action against (barely) cloaked Iranian aggression in Iraq is predictable.
For what it's worth, readers may appreciate a bit of a flashback to a 2007 analysis of the dynamic now at play: A New Course In Iraq...For Iran.
As recently as mid-August, Major General Rick Lynch said that his forces and military intelligence were tracking about 50 members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps in his area of operations, which includes the southern edge of Baghdad and some of the provincial areas to its south, including Karbala. Of the IRGC operatives known to be active in his region, Major General Lynch said, “We’ve got about 50 of those. They go back and forth. There’s a porous border.”
And just across those porous borders lie myriad Iranian terrorist training camps, teaching, arming and paying Iraqis to fight their proxy war against America and the Iraqi state, seeking instability in Iraq in the immediate and increased Iranian infiltration, influence and control in the longer term. And the better they can achieve this, the fewer of its own valuable and highly trained Quds Force operatives and terror facilitators need be put at physical risk of being killed or captured in Iraq by a new American commander [who] clearly seeks to engage without hesitation those within his Iraqi theater of operations who kill his men, Coalition forces and Iraqi civilians. Even the fearsome Iranians who never lack for threat and bluster.
So, while General Petraeus reported that Iran’s Quds Force and their Lebanese Hizballah terrorist facilitators have vacated Iraqi territory, he did not say that the Iranian threat has abated as a result nor did he say that all Iranians have left the theater. He, in fact, said just the opposite: The Iranian threat continues to grow.
That was in September, 2007. He was clearly correct.
Meanwhile, Muqtada al-Sadr is having statements read in Iraq on his behalf. It is hard for Muqi to deliver a speech in Najaf, Iraq when he is in Iran. And his written words are no doubt the product of Iranian direction. Remember, Sadr has always been little more than a slumlord from Sadr City, named for his father, who was decidedly of greater import than his son. And his Mahdi Army has always been a consortium of simple street thugs. Iran now finds them useful and trains and arms them - and directs Daddy's son to play the right part.
But how much of this matters? Any counter-move(s) by General Petraeus to react to Iranian aggression will be portrayed as a hawkish administration seeking yet another war.
It doesn't really matter much, apparently, that Iran has already found that war. Does it?
'As Mother Jones’ Jonathan Stein notes today, McCain’s description of what happened is “completely misleading” and wrong. In fact, Sadr’s call for a ceasefire only came after members of Maliki’s political party traveled to Iran to broker a deal with him.'
You have no way of knowing who asked for the ceasefire and your crapp. biased article from thinkprogress who cited another crappy biased article from 'motherjones' doesn't even take a stand on that issue.
But thanks for the lies and spam you mental case.
(He's here screeching because he completely screwed up the participants in Iraq!)
news.monstersandcritics.com/middleeast/news/article_1397691.php/Iraqi_g overnment_vows_to_demilitarize_Basra__2nd_Lead_?compage=40&comcount=64&coml imit=20
give it a rest, idiot.Apr 2nd, 2008 - 01:02:56
'(al-Maliki's people (Dawa and Badr groups) went to Iran to ask for help, as al-Sadr was already there'
YES, they are his backers and he is hiding there after a string of defeats which has cut the size of his muddy army almost in half.
================================================
THIS SCHMUCK DOES NOT EVEN KNOW WHO IS WHO AMONGST THE SHIA FACTIONS!!!
----------
Dawa and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council are two of the main parties in the religious-Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, which won a plurality of seats in both the provisional January 2005 Iraqi election and the longer-term December 2005 election. The party is led by Nouri al-Maliki, who is also the current Prime Minister of Iraq.
Badr Organization (previously known as Badr Brigade or Bader Corps) is the armed wing of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Headed by Hadi Al-Amiri it participated in the 2005 Iraqi election as part of the United Iraqi Alliance coalition. Its members have entered the new Iraqi army and police force.
THE DAWA AND BADR FACTIONS BACK AL-MALIKI, NOT AL-SADR!!!
The Mahdi Army, also known as the Mahdi Militia or Jaish al Mahdi is an Iraqi paramilitary force created by the Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in June 2003.
Re this nonsensical out-of-context argument:
''“I don’t want to suggest I’ve absorbed all of the facts,” about the situation in Basra, Mr. Obama said. But, he continued, what he had heard “appears consistent with my general analysis. The presence of our troops and their excellence has resulted in some reduction in violence. It has not resolved the underlying tensions that exist in Iraq.”''
www.nytimes.com/2008/03/30/us/politics/30campaign.html?_r=1
'As if that’s not everyone’s analysis. Neither George Bush or John McCain or David Petraeus has ever said anything to contradict Obama’s valueless declaration. They have never suggested that the surge had “resolved the underlying tensions.”
=================================================
Obama is NOT saying that ANYONE ELSE suggested that the surge had “resolved the underlying tensions.” He's making the statement on his own; irrespective of what anyone else said, or did not say.
These are the kind of lies that have gotten us 5+ years of wrongheaded strategy and 4,000 dead. YES, the British pulled out too soon - but they're our allies; so why couldn't Bush talk them out of it? Obama did not mention it - and so what?
Here's his complete press conference IN CONTEXT, including the portion of the key sentence omitted:
thepage.time.com/transcript-of-obama-press-availability/
Q: Senator - Basra and Iraq in general has been plunged back into quite a bit of violence in the last few days. I’m interested in your take on that and if this has any effect, for instance, on plans to, you know, your proposals to withdraw troops. What you think the course we might take right now?
BO: Well, obviously, we’re still getting news from the front, so I don’t want to suggest that I have absorbed all of the facts. Based on what I’ve seen so far, it appears consistent with my general analysis which is the presence of our troops and their excellence has resulted in some reduction in violence. It has not resolved the underlying tensions that exist in Iraq. If we are going to bring long-term stability to Iraq, it is going to have less to do with our military presence there and more to do with the ability of the various factions, not just Sunni-Shia but, as we’re seeing now in Basra, Shia-Shia, inner-sectarian conflict, to be resolved. And I actually believe that we have a better chance of resolving it by setting a clear timeframe for withdrawal, in consultation with our commanders on the ground, at a deliberate but careful pace. Time would be ample for them to then come together, but they’d understand that we’re not going to be permanently occupying the country. So there’s nothing that’s happened in Basra that either surprises me or undermines my basic view that it is the political accommodations rather than our military presence that is going to bring about long-term stability. Unless you are willing to do what John McCain has suggested, which is essentially to set up a permanent occupation in Iraq, in which we are functioning as some sort of military protectorate. And, setting aside the enormous costs, $10 billion to $12 billion a month, which is unsustainable and would erode our economy here at home - the strategic implications of a long-term presence in Iraq and how that can be used to recruit terrorists, how it distracts us from having to finish the job in Afghanistan, are all reasons why I think that is a fundamentally flawed policy.
www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2008-04-01-iraqnews_N.htm
BAGHDAD — On the eve of the Iraqi government's showdown last week with radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia, Ismail Shnawa's commander ordered him not to fight.
'He told us not to shoot back even if we get shot at by the Mahdi Army,' said Shnawa, a soldier in Iraq's paramilitary police force that is commanded by the Iraqi army.
The six-day showdown with al-Sadr and other Shiite militias was the toughest test for Iraqi government forces since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. The week of violence exposed troubling signs that the country's security forces have much work before they can take over for U.S. troops. Militias and their followers remain entrenched within the government forces, and units sympathetic to al-Sadr, such as Shnawa's, refused to fight.
In the southern town of Basra, more than 400 Iraqi soldiers and officers handed their weapons to the enemy, Ministry of Interior spokesman Abdel Karim Khalaf said. In Baghdad, at least 65 Iraqi soldiers and policemen switched loyalties, said Baghdad's deputy mayor, Naeem al-Kaabi, a Sadrist leader. Many others either wouldn't fight or willingly surrendered, including Shnawa and 50 others in his unit. Units that did fight struggled to gain ground against the powerful Shiite militias.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared victory Tuesday in the vital oil hub of Basra, even as the Mahdi Army he had vowed to crush remained armed and in control of large swaths. 'The Sadrists control more areas in Basra than when the fighting began,' said Osama al-Nujaif, a secular Sunni lawmaker who helped broker the cease-fire.As al-Maliki's crackdown on the militias faltered, U.S. and British forces were increasingly drawn into the fight by launching airstrikes and artillery shells at enemy positions, battling militants on the ground and providing critical logistical support.
British forces in Basra had to evacuate and treat Iraqi wounded, refuel Iraqi aircraft and provide manpower to ferry supplies, said Maj. Tom Holloway, a British army spokesman. In Baghdad, U.S. forces stepped in to resupply Iraqi soldiers with water and ammunition when the Iraqi supply chain broke down, said Lt. Col. Mike Pemrick, who oversees Iraqi security forces for the U.S. Army unit operating in al-Sadr's stronghold in Sadr City on the east side of Baghdad.
In the centralized hierarchy of Iraq's armed forces, each unit's success or failure hinged on the leadership and political loyalties of the commanding officer. 'It came down to individual commanders,' Pemrick said. 'Some ensured their soldiers were getting the supplies they needed and doing their missions, but with some others there were problems.'
Two of the seven Iraqi battalions, or about 600 men, that Pemrick works with failed to follow orders when it came time to fight, he said. 'The commander wanted these guys to get out and man their checkpoints, and they didn't want to,' he said. 'One unit had a lot of soldiers from Sadr City, and their commander felt threatened by the Mahdi Army.'
The other five battalions performed well, he said, but U.S. troops avoided asking the Iraqis to take on difficult tasks, such as patrolling for Mahdi Army teams firing mortar rounds. Instead, Iraqi responsibilities were limited to manning checkpoints that controlled access to al-Sadr's stronghold. 'We focused on what we knew they could do,' he said.
Shnawa's unit, which was operating south of Sadr City, was not one of the brigades that Pemrick works with, but both related similar stories.
(more details in the link)
(The numbers within are coming from U.S. military officials)
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/01/AR200804010316 5.html
Over the week that began March 25, when the offensive began in Basra, there were 728 attacks against U.S. coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and civilians across Iraq, according to U.S. military data obtained by The Washington Post. Of these, 430 -- or almost 60 percent of the attacks -- occurred in Baghdad, the major focus of last year's buildup of 30,000 additional U.S. troops. The forces have begun to withdraw, and the rest are to be gone by the end of July. In comparison, the average weekly attack rate in Baghdad last June was 326 attacks, according to U.S. military statistics.
By Monday, a day after Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army militiamen to lay down their arms, the attacks quickly subsided close to levels seen before the government offensive.
On March 23 and 24, the two days before the offensive began, there were, respectively, 42 and 38 attacks across Iraq. On each of those days, there were only 14 attacks in Baghdad. Over the next few days, attacks in the capital spiked to as many as six times that number.
--- Beginning of key point ---
The rapid containment of the fighting suggests that the 'surge' of U.S. forces is but one factor in bringing down violence in Iraq and that in Shiite areas, a cease-fire imposed by Sadr on his militiamen last August may be more significant.
--- End of key point ---
(That's the very point I've consistently made - since the Shia are the majority, the al-Sadr cease-fire has done more to reduce overall violence than the 'surge' involving the Sunni)
The reduction in violence across Iraq on Monday, which appeared to continue Tuesday, also highlights the power Sadr wields on Iraq's streets and the control he exerts over much of his militia, despite assertions by U.S. military commanders that the cleric's movement has been weakened by the buildup.
The figures and analysis offer more evidence of how swiftly U.S. forces were drawn into a power struggle unfolding between Sadr and rival Shiite groups that lead Iraq's government, mainly Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by Abdul Aziz-Hakim.
The data, said U.S. military officials who provided the information on condition of anonymity because it was not authorized for release, are a preliminary but thorough accounting that could be readjusted slightly.
The data include attacks against U.S. troops, Iraqi security forces and civilians. U.S. forces bore the brunt of those attacks last week, suggesting that they were taking the lead combat role in many areas or were perceived by Mahdi Army fighters to be taking the lead. The data square with on-the-ground reports that American soldiers were involved in battles and were being targeted with roadside bombs, rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons in many Shiite enclaves of Baghdad.
(From that noted left-wing publication, the Wall Street Journal - hey, that was irony ... the Mahdi Army retained their weapons and even gained some territory in the deal, while the breakaway criminal gangs continue to function. al-Maliki is seen as an American puppet, and the U.S. ends up getting blamed by the Iraqi people. The question is who will retain control in upcoming provincial elections, which is the real reason that al-Maliki launched the attacks. Every side in Iraq is corrupt and out for their own interests; NOT the interests of a unified Iraq.)
online.wsj.com/public/article/SB120695720918576769-0pc9ooRI2xihRh9C_ukv jPe2O4M_20080501.html?mod=tff_main_tff_top
April 1, 2008; Page A8
The Iraqi government's inability to oust Moqtada al-Sadr's militia from Basra has boosted the fortunes of the Shiite cleric while damaging the standing of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Mr. Sadr appears to be the one clear winner from the inconclusive fighting in the country's second-biggest city, which began to taper off Monday after the cleric urged his followers to observe a truce.
The failure of the Iraqi strikes against Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army has implications for both U.S. policy in Iraq and the presidential campaign. Worsening conditions in Iraq pose a particular challenge for likely Republican nominee Sen. John McCain, who has staked his candidacy on his ability to persuade antiwar voters that victory in Iraq remains possible. Sen. McCain departed from his usual talking points about Iraq Monday to say that he was surprised by Mr. Maliki's decision to order the Basra strike. 'Maliki decided to take on this operation without consulting the Americans,' he told reporters traveling with him in Mississippi. 'I'm surprised he'd take it on himself to go down and take charge of a military offensive.'
U.S. and British commanders said that Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army fought the Iraqi forces to a draw and were able to retain their control over large portions of Basra and other Shiite areas of the country. Militants linked to Mr. Sadr also showed an ability to inflict pain on the U.S., killing two American officials in sophisticated mortar attacks against the heavily fortified Green Zone in Baghdad in recent days.
U.S. officials said that Mr. Sadr was in a stronger political position, as well, because of the public perception that Mr. Maliki ordered the strikes to weaken the cleric and his followers ahead of provincial elections scheduled for October. If the elections were held today, 'there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that Sadrists would win across the south,' said a U.S. official at the American Embassy in Baghdad who monitors Iraqi politics.
It's critical for al-Maliki that HIS allies win provincial elections in order to exert local control. As American officials indicate in the last post, more important than the 'military' outcome was the 'political' ramifications - and here, al-Maliki came off poorly in the South. Unless he can follow through with promised infrastructure improvements, the Hamas win in Gaza in 2006 could potentially serve as the model.
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/04/usa.israelandthepalestinians
The Bush administration, caught out by the rise of Hamas, embarked on a secret project for the armed overthrow of the Islamist government in Gaza, it emerged yesterday.
Vanity Fair reports in its April edition that President George Bush and the secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, signed off on a plan for the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, to remove the Hamas authorities in Gaza. The plan called for Washington's allies in the region to funnel arms and salaries to Fatah fighters who would lead a rising against Hamas.
But the project was controversial even within the administration, the magazine reports. 'There were severe fissures among neoconservatives over this,' David Wurmser, a former Middle East adviser to the vice-president, Dick Cheney, told the magazine. 'We were ripping each other to pieces.'
Wurmser resigned his post in the vice-president's office in July 2007, only weeks after bloody clashes in Gaza between Hamas and Fatah that led to the Islamist organisation taking total control of the territory. 'It looks to me that what happened wasn't so much a coup by Hamas but an attempted coup by Fatah that was pre-empted before it could happen,' he said.
The Bush administration plan sought to undo the results of elections in the West Bank and Gaza in January 2006 which, to the chagrin of White House and State Department officials, saw Hamas win a majority of seats in the Palestinian legislature.
The project was approved by Bush, Rice, and Elliott Abrams, the hawkish deputy national security adviser.
The 2006 election result was seen as an affront to the central premise of the Bush administration's policy in the Middle East - that democratic elections would inexorably lead to pro-western governments.
With the victory of Hamas, Rice moved swiftly to try to persuade Abbas to take steps to dissolve the Hamas authority in Gaza. When Abbas did not move quickly enough, the US consul general in Jerusalem, Jake Walles, was despatched to Ramallah to deliver a curt reminder.
The magazine quotes a memo for Walles's meeting with Hamas as saying: 'You should make clear your intention to declare a state of emergency and form an emergency government.'
The central man figure in Washington's plan was Mohammed Dahlan, who had been Yasser Arafat's security chief in Gaza and who had established close ties with the CIA as early as the 1990s. The magazine cites three unidentified US officials quoting Bush as saying: 'He's our guy.'
According to the magazine, Rice played a main role in trying to persuade Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to offer training and funding to the Fatah fighters. Israeli officials admitted in December 2006 that Egypt had sent weapons to the Fatah faction in Gaza.
Let's just put a few recent events together, and see where it goes - an opportunity for a rational discussion. I'm genuinely concerned that the Mideast problems will extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, and with the price of oil dependent on what happens, it can affect our 'soft' economy:
a). Cheney has been after Iran for years; just as he was after Iraq. Use the 'Axis' speech as an indicator. Incidentally, the latest news re the two Koreas does not read well at all, speaking of the 'Axis'.
b). Admiral Fallon retires, removing someone in power in opposition to action against Iran; and an impediment to Petraeus' policy.
c). While the fact remains that our troops are all tied up with both Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush has never been too keen on the logistics, and I doubt that would dissuade him from tackling Iran; or whether he now understands that starting a war has consequences years later. After December, it's not his job to worry about all of that - not that he's ever worried about such things before.
d). Al-Maliki, rather than directing his militias' efforts (aka 'the Iraqi Army) towards the many discrete criminal gangs in Basra, decides he needs to move against al Sadr before the provincial elections to remove competition. Since both al-Maliki and al-Sadr are backed by Iran, the risks are seen as minimal. This ends up essentially in a violent standoff even in Baghdad, and al-Maliki has to send representatives to the QODS leadership in Iran to get Iran to make an approach to al-Sadr (who was in Iran at the time) to unwind the mess. Instead of the Iraqi Army being seen as a force of now about 400,000, it becomes a ragtag group of militias with divided loyalty, swayed more by Shia loyalty than to Iraq itself.
Now, Iran's own conclusions:
a). They can control all of the Shia parties in Iraq, despite the presence of U.S. troops. Since the Shia are the Iraqi majority, Iran can either escalate or de-escalate tensions indirectly, with 162,000 American troops acting as peacekeepers. The Sunni cannot be counted on to stick with the program, since the U.S. is talking about not paying the CLC's down the road for not doing anything, since al Qaeda has moved north. The Kurds would rather have their own country, as the Peshmerga are capable, and they have oil deals going.
b). al-Maliki has really not accomplished anything he set out to in Mosul. He has to deal with integrating the Sunnni militias into the Iraqi Army, and that's moving slowly. That's the alternative to the U.S.' paying the CLC's themselves.
Another interesting link on Mosul and the Kurds:
www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JD03Ak01.html
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Here's an article right out of the Iranian press which shows what they're pitching to the Iranian public. I won't even bother to excerpt, since there's so much in there; but it's a remarkable world view, and should be examined.
www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=49868§ionid=351020104
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My theory is that Iran stirred up the latest problems in Iraq to keep the U.S. occupied, rather than our potentially getting involved with any actions against Iran. Iran is selling oil to China and India and others, and the Russians don't want to see U.S. military action against Iran, either. Bush is rounding up new NATO membership from amongst former Soviet satellites, irritating the situation with Russia that much more. Those new prospects to NATO supposedly would provide troops for Afghanistan as a thank-you to Bush for his efforts.
Not a good outlook at all. The U.S. public's becoming inured to all the problems, and their apathy in just being worn out hearing about it for 5 years may be the real problem. Like anaesthesia at the dentist; they're unaware of what's really going in.
www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JD03Ak01.html
The battle of Basra may be virtually over. But nobody's talking about the invisible Battle of Mosul.
President George W Bush's self-described 'defining moment' in Iraq amounted to this: General Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) , brokered a deal in Qom, Iran, between Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's envoys and Hadi al-Amri, the head of the Badr Organization and number two to Adbul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and a key player of the government in Baghdad. That sealed the end of the battle of Basra.
The IRGC was designated last year by Washington as a terrorist organization. Thus Iranian 'terrorists' brokered a peace deal between the two largest Shi'ite parties in Iraq - ending a Baghdad government offensive that was fully authorized and supported by air power by Washington, according to Bush's National Security Adviser Steven Hadley.
Meanwhile, in northern Iraq, the Kurds are meticulously involved in de facto annexing strategically crucial, oil-rich Tameem province, whose capital is Kirkuk, with reserves of up to 15 billion barrels. Sunni Arabs and Shi'ite Turkmen fear the prospect - and are dead-set against the postponed Kirkuk referendum, which should have been held on December 2007. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government in Baghdad knew for sure they would lose this vote and thus see Kirkuk become a part of autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan. So giving the excuse of 'administrative problems', they simply postponed the referendum.
It's true that Saddam Hussein 'Arabized' Kirkuk by getting rid of Kurds and bringing in Sunni Arabs. In theory, the name of the game now is restoring Kirkuk's population balance to the same level prior to Saddam's forced Arabization. The Kurds are angered with the referendum being postponed and any spark at this stage could turn into another full-blown civil war.
It's a total impasse. Sunni Arabs in Iraq would never forgive any government in Baghdad for delivering Kirkuk to the Kurds. And the Kurds will fight to the death for Kirkuk. Sunni Arabs keep denouncing accelerated, regional 'Kurdification' – translated as Kurdish monopoly of the provincial council and jobs in the police and civil service. This has led to the formation of Sunni Arab 'Awakening Councils' - just as in the Sunni belt - also financed and armed by the Americans.
Kurdish journalist Rebwar Fatah insists Kurds will never give up Kirkuk - unless in the very unlikely event that the city's population rejects annexation in the endlessly postponed Kirkuk referendum. And no matter how the explosive situation is spun, Kirkuk's population will always want to directly benefit from the surrounding oil wealth.
(more detail in the linked story)
Whittling Away at Sadr
By Austin Bay
After his outlaw militiamen raised white flags and skedaddled from their latest round of combat with the Iraqi Army, radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr declared victory.
He always does. He understands media bravado. He wagers that survival bandaged by bombast and swathed in sensational headlines is a short-term triumph. Survive long enough, and Sadr bets he will prevail.
This time, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued a contrarian press release, however, calling the Iraqi Army's anti-militia operations in southern Iraq a 'success.'
A dispute over casualties in the firefights has ensued, as it always does. An Iraqi Interior Ministry spokesman alleged that Sadr's militia had been hit hard in six days of fighting, suffering 215 dead, 155 arrested and approximately 600 wounded. The government spokesman gave no casualty figures for Iraqi security forces.
No one, of course, could offer an independent confirmation, but if the numbers are accurate they provide an indirect confirmation of reports that Sadr's Mahdi Militia (Jaish al-Mahdi, hence the acronym JAM) had at least a couple thousand fighters scattered throughout southern Iraq. This is not shocking news, but a reason to launch a limited offensive when opportunity appeared.
Numbers, however, are a very limited gauge. The firefights, white flags, media debate and, for that matter, the Iraqi-led anti-militia offensive itself are the visible manifestations of a slow, opaque and occasionally violent political and psychological struggle that in the long term is likely democratic Iraq's most decisive: the control, reduction and eventual elimination of Shia gangs and terrorists strongly influenced if not directly supported by Iran.
Other Shia militia and gangs confront Iraq, but Sadr is the most vexing case. His father, a leading Shia cleric, was murdered -- many Iraqis believe at the order of Saddam Hussein. That makes his father a political and religious symbol.
And Sadr knows it. So do his financiers.
For four years, the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi government have intermittently sparred with Sadr, sometimes in parliament, sometimes in the streets.
The Iraqi government's strategy has been to bring former insurgents into the political process. Since interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi articulated that goal in mid-2004, the central government's complex array of enemies has sought to thwart that program.
Saddam's old cohorts managed to convince themselves that if they spread enough money around, killed enough people and hammered the U.S. electorate with bloody headlines the United States would leave and the Iraqi government would eventually collapse -- and they would return to power. Saddam's capture, trial and execution has all but snuffed out the old-line Baathists. Recall Maliki stoutly defended his decision to carry out the court's sentence of capital punishment. He bet with Saddam dead the tyrant's cult of personality would wither. It has.
Al-Qaida pursued the same strategy of blood for headlines. Al-Qaida in Iraq tried to ignite a sectarian war -- its now-dead emir, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, made that goal explicit in February 2004. Al-Qaida massacred en masse, to the point that U.S. Sen. Harry Reid (D for Defeatist) declared the war in Iraq lost. Then, the Sunni tribes in Anbar turned on al-Qaida. Sunni political integration is by no means complete, but al-Qaida has failed.
Now the Shia-led Iraqi government focuses on its chief Shia nemesis. How the Iraqi government handles Sadr matters. In August 2004, Sadr's thugs grabbed the Grand Mosque in Najaf. Sadr was counting on Americans to bomb the mosque. The United States opted to follow the political lead of Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Sistani's aides told coalition officers: 'Let us deal with Sadr. We know how to handle him and will do so. However, the coalition must not make him a martyr.'
The Iraqi way often appears to be indecisive, until you learn to look at its counter-insurgency methods in the frame of achieving political success, instead of the frame of American presidential elections.
In southern Iraq and east Baghdad, Sadr once again lost street face. Despite the predictable media umbrage, this translates into political deterioration.
Think of the Iraqi anti-Sadr method as a form of suffocation, a political war waged with the blessing of Ayatollah Sistani that requires daily economic and political action, persistent police efforts and occasional military thrusts.
Iraq Army Flexes Muscles in Basra
By ROBERT H. REID – 3 hours ago
BAGHDAD (AP) — Iraqi soldiers rolled through a Shiite militia stronghold in Basra on Wednesday, drawing scattered bombs and bullets that wounded a camera operator for a U.S.-funded TV station and narrowly missed the commander of government troops in the city.
Followers of anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr accused the army of violating an Iranian-brokered agreement that ended last week's fighting, which erupted in Basra and quickly engulfed Baghdad and major cities of the Shiite south.
Those complaints raised concern that fighting could flare again as the Iraqi government and Shiite militias maneuver for control of Basra — the country's oil capital 340 miles southeast of Baghdad and a major commercial center of 2 million people.
Iraqi troops met no significant resistance as a dozen-vehicle convoy drove Wednesday into the Hayaniyah district of central Basra, scene of fierce clashes last week with al-Sadr's Mahdi Army fighters.
Troops set up checkpoints and searched a few houses before leaving the neighborhood after a couple of hours, witnesses said.
An Iraqi cameraman working for the U.S.-funded Alhurra satellite television station was shot in the leg as he filmed the operation in Hayaniyah.
Later, the camera operator, Mazin al-Tayar, told Alhurra by telephone that the soldiers faced 'many roadside bombs and mortar rounds' during the operation, although there were no reports of military casualties.
One of the bombs exploded near a vehicle carrying the local Iraqi army commander, Lt. Gen. Mohan al-Fireji, but caused no injuries, according to Defense Ministry spokesman Mohammed al-Askari, who was traveling with the general.
The Basra joint operations center announced that Iraqi soldiers had detained two suspected militia figures in the Qibla area. A gunbattle erupted during the raid and an Iraqi army vehicle was set on fire.
Nevertheless, Basra's provincial governor, Mohammed al-Waili, said the overall situation in the oil-rich city was 'very calm and stable' and that normalcy was returning.
'We issued orders to all government employees to go to their offices starting from today and they will be obliged to work their full schedule,' he said.
But Basra residents contacted by telephone said many people were fearful that the truce might not last.
Underscoring those fears, clashes broke out hours later after Iraqi troops raided Basra's Maakal area, another Mahdi Army stronghold, according to local police who could not immediately provide further details.
A Mahdi Army spokesman in Basra, known as Abu Liqa al-Basri, said Wednesday that the militiamen were keeping a low profile on al-Sadr's orders. He accused Iraqi security forces of creating a 'crisis of trust' by mounting 'provocative raids' and arresting al-Sadr supporters.
'If the Iraqi army continues in its provocative raids, the consequences will be bad,' he said.
Despite an end to heavy fighting, the Interior Ministry spokesman, Maj. Gen. Abdul-Karim Khalaf, said security operations were continuing and that an April 8 deadline for gunmen to surrender their weapons remained in effect.
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Darth TaterApr 1st, 2008 - 16:38:05
If Sadr (and Iran) were doing so well at winning in Basra, why the cease-fire? Could it be too many dead or wounded to be able to keep
a hold in the South of Iraq from his main rival there? Could it be he
expected the Iraqi government forces to fold early and often, but
instead they gave better than they got with little American help?
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